Current Edition- California Business Practice

The Peacemaker Quarterly- April 2014

Sunday, October 30, 2011

Dodger's Legal Troubles

The Dodger's legal troubles keeps getting worse and worse. Anyone else agree?

Check out this article regarding the Brian Stow case...


An attorney representing the Dodgers and owner Frank McCourt filed a civil complaint against the two men charged in the Opening Day beating of San Francisco Giants fan Bryan Stow in Los Angeles Superior Court last week, arguing that they should be held liable for the attack, not McCourt, the team or other parties named in the suit filed by Stow's family in May.

"One of the things the jury will be asked to do is to determine what percentage of fault various individuals have for this event," McCourt's attorney Jerome Jackson told ESPNLosAngeles.com.

“

They are saying we're 100 percent liable. But does that mean Norwood and Sanchez, who beat this guy up, have no liability? And, does it mean Mr. Stow himself has no liability?

” -- Dodgers owner Frank McCourt's
lawyer Jerome Jackson

"You're saying to the jury, 'They (the Stow family) are saying we're 100 percent liable. But does that mean (Marvin) Norwood and (Louis) Sanchez, who beat this guy up, have no liability? And, does it mean Mr. Stow himself has no liability?' "

Jackson said that if the case goes to a jury trial, he will ask jurors to assign percentages of liability to the Dodgers, McCourt, Norwood, Sanchez, Stow and the other entities named in the original suit. If financial damages are awarded, they would be paid out at those percentages.

"I've been doing these cases for 23 years and I have never seen one yet in which it didn't take at least two people to tango," he said, referring to the notion that jurors could decide Stow bears some liability in the attack. "So stay tuned and stand by."

Jackson compared the Stow case to a suit filed by a woman named Maria Para Helenius, who lost sight in one of her eyes after being involved in a fight in the Dodger Stadium parking lot in 2005. A jury found her assailant, Denise Ordaz, 85 percent liable for the attack, Helenius 15 percent liable and the Dodgers zero percent liable. She was awarded $500,420, according to court documents obtained by ESPNLosAngeles.com, 85 percent of which was to be paid by Ordaz.

Stow, who was in a coma for several months following the attack, remains in a Bay Area rehabilitation facility. His family has said that he is speaking again and has made great progress since the March 31 attack, but that he still needs around-the-clock care indefinitely.

No hearings in the civil case are scheduled until January, but lawyers from Major League Baseball prominently cited the case as evidence of McCourt's mismanagement of the club in filings to a Delaware bankruptcy court earlier this week.

The Stow family is the largest of Frank McCourt's unsecured creditors. Their family lawyer, Tom Girardi, has said damages in the case could total as much as $50 million if a jury finds McCourt liable.

Girardi maintains that the Dodgers were negligent in providing adequate security on the night Stow was beaten. He said he was disgusted by McCourt's decision to countersue Norwood and Sanchez.

"Everybody makes mistakes in life. How you're judged is by the way you respond to them," Girardi told ESPNLosAngeles.com. "Here you have this family, this massive financial impact, and (McCourt's) plan is to sue the two people who were arrested because we didn't do anything about order and safety in the stadium."

Jackson said that he sympathizes with Stow and his family, but that their complaint should be with the alleged perpetrators of the attack, not McCourt.

Security for Opening Day, Jackson said, was the most extensive he'd seen in 23 years of representing the team and twice the size of the security force at Dodger Stadium during a series against the New York Yankees in June 2010, the park's most-attended series of the year.

"What happened to Bryan Stow was a tragedy," he said. "The Dodgers have held fundraisers. The Dodgers have helped police in solving this case. That doesn't mean we're legally responsible for what happens here.

"What baffles me is that the level of public outrage at the Dodgers seems to be higher than the level of outrage at the people who inflicted the blows."

Sanchez and Norwood remain in custody and are awaiting trial on the criminal charges. Both have entered not guilty pleas. Their next appearance in Los Angeles Superior Court is scheduled for Nov. 4.

Sunday, October 23, 2011

Constitutional Rights Taken Advantage of to Protect Disgusting Acts on Minors

http://articles.ocregister.com/2008-01-19/sports/24725081_1_web-sites-water-polo-photos

Wednesday, October 19, 2011

Katrina negligence lawsuit has implications for all hospitals

http://www.usatoday.com/news/health/2010-01-10-katrina-hospital-lawsuit_N.htm

Tuesday, October 18, 2011

Supreme Court Decision: Global Human Rights Law?

On Monday, the Supreme Court agreed to hear a case that would resolve the dispute of whether or not corporations and political groups can be held liable in American courts for their involvement in the torture, killing and enslavement of individuals abroad. There are essentially two U.S. laws that give American courts the jurisdiction to decide human rights cases. The Supreme Court stated that it will clarify if these cases are limited to the individuals who committed the injustice or the corporations or political organizations as well.

The Supreme Court will hear the case of about 12 Nigerians who sued the Royal Dutch Shell oil company for torturing and executing dissidents in Nigeria in the 1990s. The Nigerians note in the lawsuit that "Shell aided and abetted the Nigerian regime." Another case that Supreme Court will hear is centered on the conflict between Palestinian authorities and the sons of a Palestinian American widow who was tortured by Palestinian intelligence officers in the 1990s. The Supreme Court will hear both cases at the same time.

While the Supreme Court has the power via legislative laws to hear cases and make decisions regarding human rights, they have not exercised that power until now. I believe that with the decisions rendered in the cases above, the American court system and subsequently the government will make great strides in setting examples in the realm of global human rights. Personally, I did not know that the Supreme Court had such power. This power could result in a new movement of peace-making through the judicial branch and court cases. The courts and the executive branch could work together in enforcing global human rights.

Friday, September 30, 2011

California Anti-Slapp

Code of Civil Procedure – Section 425.16.

(a) The Legislature finds and declares that there has been a disturbing increase in lawsuits brought primarily to chill the valid exercise of the constitutional rights of freedom of speech and petition for the redress of grievances. The Legislature finds and declares that it is in the public interest to encourage continued participation in matters of public significance, and that this participation should not be chilled through abuse of the judicial process. To this end, this section shall be construed broadly.

(b) (1) A cause of action against a person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech under the United States Constitution or the California Constitution in connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special motion to strike, unless the court determines that the plaintiff has established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim. (2) In making its determination, the court shall consider the pleadings, and supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which the liability or defense is based. (3) If the court determines that the plaintiff has established a probability that he or she will prevail on the claim, neither that determination nor the fact of that determination shall be admissible in evidence at any later stage of the case, or in any subsequent action, and no burden of proof or degree of proof otherwise applicable shall be affected by that determination in any later stage of the case or in any subsequent proceeding.

(c) (1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), in any action subject to subdivision (b), a prevailing defendant on a special motion to strike shall be entitled to recover his or her attorney’s fees and costs. If the court finds that a special motion to strike is frivolous or is solely intended to cause unnecessary delay, the court shall award costs and reasonable attorney’s fees to a plaintiff prevailing on the motion, pursuant to Section 128.5. (2) A defendant who prevails on a special motion to strike in an action subject to paragraph (1) shall not be entitled to attorney’s fees and costs if that cause of action is brought pursuant to Section 6259, 11130, 11130.3, 54960, or 54960.1 of the Government Code. Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to prevent a prevailing defendant from recovering attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to subdivision (d) of Section 6259, 11130.5, or 54690.5.

(d) This section shall not apply to any enforcement action brought in the name of the people of the State of California by the Attorney General, district attorney, or city attorney, acting as a public prosecutor.

(e) As used in this section, “act in furtherance of a person’s right of petition or free speech under the United States or California Constitution in connection with a public issue” includes: (1) any written or oral statement or writing made before a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, (2) any written or oral statement or writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, (3) any written or oral statement or writing made in a place open to the public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest, or (4) any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest.

(f) The special motion may be filed within 60 days of the service of the complaint or, in the court’s discretion, at any later time upon terms it deems proper. The motion shall be scheduled by the clerk of the court for a hearing not more than 30 days after the service of the motion unless the docket conditions of the court require a later hearing.

(g) All discovery proceedings in the action shall be stayed upon the filing of a notice of motion made pursuant to this section. The stay of discovery shall remain in effect until notice of entry of the order ruling on the motion. The court, on noticed motion and for good cause shown, may order that specified discovery be conducted notwithstanding this subdivision.

(h) For purposes of this section, “complaint” includes “cross-complaint” and “petition,” “plaintiff” includes “cross-complainant” and “petitioner,” and “defendant” includes “cross-defendant” and “respondent.”

(i) An order granting or denying a special motion to strike shall be appealable under Section 904.1.

(j) (1) Any party who files a special motion to strike pursuant to this section, and any party who files an opposition to a special motion to strike, shall, promptly upon so filing, transmit to the Judicial Council, by e-mail or facsimile, a copy of the endorsed, filed caption page of the motion or opposition, a copy of any related notice of appeal or petition for a writ, and a conformed copy of any order issued pursuant to this section, including any order granting or denying a special motion to strike, discovery, or fees. (2) The Judicial Council shall maintain a public record of information transmitted pursuant to this subdivision for at least three years, and may store the information on microfilm or other appropriate electronic media.

Legal Definition of Obscenity


See Miller v.California, U.S. Supreme Court

Monday, September 26, 2011

Something We Discussed in Class

Article I, Section 2, Clause 3 of the Constitution states,

"Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union, according to their respective Numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole Number of free Persons, including those bound to Service for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other Persons."

When this topic came up in our Section 2 class we discussed the potential reasoning behind the inclusion of this clause. As representation would be determined by population, the issue of whether or not to count slaves was made a big deal by the framers. Many northerners held that slaves were merely property and deserved no representation whatsoever. They maintained that counting slaves would put the north at a disadvantage and would in fact incentivize an increase in slave importation.

With the shift from a confederacy to a federal system, states with lower representation would lose power in Congress. Not wanting to be at a disadvantage, the southern states pressed the issue of representation because of the benefit it provided. The 3/5 rule came as a result of the conflict between the slave and free states, but it did not originate at the Convention. It actually came from the Articles of Confederation and had previously existed as a means to collect requisitions which was the source of income for Congress under the Articles. To go along with allowing increased representation in the slave states, Gouverneur Morris of Pennsylvania recommended that the clause also include the concept that taxation would be directly proportioned based on representation. As such, southern states would get the representation that they desired but would also be burdened by the additional taxes that would be incurred as a result of the compromise.

In affect the Compromise was more anti-slavery than we sometimes suggest it to be. The 3/5 rule removed whatever sectional benefit counting the slaves created. Rather than suggesting that slaves are not persons, the framers acknowledge the contrary in having them considered in both representation and direct taxation.