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Sunday, January 31, 2010

Here's the story of the Hurricane

Rubin "Hurricane" Carter's story, one that would be interesting to discuss in class...

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YngpWylqQ3A (Bob Dylan's interpretation)

Rubin "Hurricane" Carter

(1937–)

Prizefighter. Born May 6, 1937, in Clifton, New Jersey. In 1966, at the height of his boxing career, Carter was wrongly convicted—twice—of a triple murder and imprisoned for nearly two decades. During the mid-1970s, his case became a cause celébrè for a number of civil rights leaders, politicians, and entertainers. He was ultimately exonerated, in 1985, after a United States district court judge declared the convictions to be based on racial prejudice.

Carter, who grew up in Paterson, New Jersey, was arrested and sent to the Jamesburg State Home for Boys at age 12 after he attacked a man with a Boy Scout knife. He claimed the man was a pedophile who had been attempting to molest one of his friends. Carter escaped before his six-year term was up and in 1954 he joined the Army, where he served in a segregated corps and began training as a boxer. He won two European light-welterweight championships and in 1956 returned to Paterson with the intention of becoming a professional boxer. Almost immediately upon his return, police arrested Carter and forced him to serve the remaining 10 months of his sentence in a state reformatory.

In 1957, Carter was again arrested, this time for purse snatching; he spent four years in Trenton State, a maximum-security prison, for that crime. After his release, he channeled his considerable anger, towards his situation and that of Paterson's African-American community, into his boxing—he turned pro in 1961 and began a startling four-fight winning streak, including two knockouts. For his lightning-fast fists, Carter soon earned the nickname "Hurricane" and became one of the top contenders for the world middleweight crown. In December 1963, in a non-title bout, he beat then-welterweight world champion Emile Griffith in a first round KO. Although he lost his one shot at the title, in a 15-round split decision to reigning champion Joey Giardello in December 1964, he was widely regarded as a good bet to win his next title bout.

As one of the most famous citizens of Paterson, Carter made no friends with the police, especially during the summer of 1964, when he was quoted in The Saturday Evening Post as expressing anger towards the occupations by police of black neighborhoods. His flamboyant lifestyle (Carter frequented the city's nightclubs and bars) and juvenile record rankled the police, as did the vehement statements he had allegedly made advocating violence in the pursuit of racial justice.

Carter was training for his next shot at the world middleweight title (against champion Dick Tiger) in October 1966 when he was arrested for the June 17th triple murder of three patrons at the Lafayette Bar & Grill in Paterson. Carter and John Artis had been arrested on the night of the crime because they fit an eyewitness description of the killers ("two Negroes in a white car"), but they had been cleared by a grand jury when the one surviving victim failed to identify them as the gunmen. Now, the state had produced two eyewitnesses, Alfred Bello and Arthur D. Bradley, who had made positive identifications. During the trial that followed, the prosecution produced little to no evidence linking Carter and Artis to the crime, a shaky motive (racially-motivated retaliation for the murder of a black tavern owner by a white man in Paterson hours before), and the only two eyewitnesses were petty criminals involved in a burglary (who were later revealed to have received money and reduced sentences in exchange for their testimony). Nevertheless, on June 29, 1967, Carter and Artis were convicted of triple murder and sentenced to three life prison terms.

Continued at http://www.biography.com/articles/Rubin-Hurricane-Carter-9542248?part=1

Saturday, January 30, 2010

Reliability of Eyewitness Testimo

Taken from http://www.apa.org/monitor/jan00/pi4.aspx

A witness to a crime looks intently at a police line-up of people, and says, "Yes, number five. That's the person who did it."

And that's practically the end of the story. Case closed. If the witness can pick the person out of a line-up, police have their perpetrator. At least on television shows.

But late last year, in light of questions raised about the reliability of such evidence, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) published the first-ever national guidelines on gathering such testimony in an attempt to make the process more scientific.

Psychologist Gary L. Wells, PhD, who was on the panel that wrote those guidelines, believes that rarely, if ever, has experimental psychology had such a definitive impact on national policy.

"The benefit for innocent suspects is immense," says Wells, professor of psychology at Iowa State University, "and it could be argued that this is one of psychology's greatest research-to-action achievements."

A flash of light

Research psychologists have been studying the reliability of eyewitness testimony for about 20 years. Their experiments have included having people watch videos of enacted crimes or staging mock crimes and asking them to identify perpetrators from photos, testing various interviewing techniques with eyewitnesses and with police interrogators, and exploring whether eyewitness accounts could be misled by questions after the event.

Early on, they found that eyewitness identification often was not very good. Studies showed that witnesses often identified the wrong person from the photos (in one study, almost half the time) and that police interviewing techniques often hampered information gathering.

At the same time, researchers found that they could improve eyewitness information by changing the way it is gathered. The researchers built, in the psychological literature, a strong case for better police practices and they testified on the reliability of eyewitness testimony in court cases.

But by and large, police departments haven't exactly knocked their doors down to find out what law enforcement was doing wrong in getting testimony to convict people.

Further, the justice system rarely gave police incentives to explore better methods, says Wells. "Courts almost never suppress identification evidence, even when the most egregiously biased line-up procedures are used."

But then came the 1990s and the widespread use of DNA testing. In cases across the country, the technique found that mistakes had been made. People had gone to prison for years for crimes that they did not commit.

Today, more than 60 people have been exonerated by DNA evidence. And most were convicted with eyewitness testimony.

Janet Reno steps in

In 1996, Gary Wells flew to Washington, D.C., at the request of DOJ staff for discussions related to his research. He was surprised to find he would be meeting with Attorney General Janet Reno. A prosecutor for most of her career, Reno had grown concerned about what the exonerations implied about eyewitness testimony. She had read articles by Wells in the American Psychologist and elsewhere and wanted to talk about his findings.

Soon after, she mandated that a national technical panel be brought together to recommend "best practices" for investigations involving eyewitnesses. The DOJ invited Wells to sit on that panel and permitted him to bring in five other psychological researchers.

Wells notes many of the researchers found the turn of events hopeful, yet "odd." They generally believed, he says, that the "experimental literature in psychology had already made a stronger and more informative case for reform than any collection of case studies [such as the DNA exonerations] could possibly muster."

But at least the exonerations had brought pressure on the system to undertake that reform.

Panel does its work

Over the next year-and-a-half, DOJ's panel of 34 people from four professions fought it out. Researchers, prosecutors, defense attorneys and law enforcement officials, in meeting after meeting and over drinks afterward, discussed and argued.

Wells says the researchers found--much to their astonishment--that "they were in the driver's seat." They had done the only research on the topic and that research gave the talks their foundation. The panel's reading material consisted of the psychological studies.

On the other hand, says Wells, he was pleasantly surprised by the police officers' reactions. The officers' own brand of research indicated something needed to be done: They had been there when a witness emphatically declared "Number Four" in a line up to be the perpetrator, when "Number Four" was a fellow police officer being used as filler.

It was the prosecutors who were more often at loggerheads with the researchers, out of fear that police failures to meet overly demanding guidelines would cast shadows over the prosecutions' cases.

Through the battles, says the DOJ project director Richard Rau, PhD, the police often served as the final arbiters. And, in October, DOJ published the guidelines.

DOJ acknowledges psychological research's primary impact on the guidelines. Reno, in her message about the impetus for the work, cites the "growing body of research in the field of eyewitness identification."

The guidelines' introduction states, "During the past 20 years, research psychologists have produced a substantial body of findings regarding eyewitness evidence," that offers the legal system a "valuable body of empirical evidence."

The 38 pages of recommendations call for, for example:

  • Interviewing a witness with open-ended questions and avoiding questions that would lead the witness. Researchers have found that open-ended questions can elicit much more information, but police tend to ask few open-ended questions and to interrupt witnesses who try to give narrative answers. On the other hand, studies have found that leading questions can change what the witnesses have to say.
  • Having only one suspect at a time be in a line-up and ensuring that "fillers" be people who fit the general description the witness has given. Researchers concluded that line-ups with more than one suspect increase the probability of a mistaken identification being taken seriously. And if fillers in a line-up don't look like the general description, the witness is likely to pick the suspect if he looks most like that description.
  • Telling the witness that the perpetrator may not be in the line-up. The research indicates witnesses sometimes feel it is their job to pick the person who looks most like the perpetrator.

The panel's researchers, however lost a battle for a recommendation that line-ups be double-blind: Police officials resisted that addition, believing it would imply they couldn't be trusted.

Psychological researchers also could not persuade the group that identification procedures should present the persons or the photos one by one, rather than in a group. Research shows that sequential presentation produces more reliable results.

However, indicates Rau, after the guidelines have been used for a few years, the DOJ may undertake processes for improving and expanding them.

In the meantime, Wells believes, the recommendations mark a sharp increase in the visibility and credibility of psychology within the legal system.

They are, he believes, a "huge turning point" because, after this time, psychology will be much more integrated into criminal justice on questions of memory and the law. And, after all, he says, "Every witness on the stand is operating from memory."

The guidelines are on the DOJ web site at www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij. Click on "What's New."

The DOJ publication on exonerations, "Convicted by Juries, Exonerated by Science," is at www.NCJRS.org in the abstracts database.

Gary L. Wells presented his research at the recent APA/American Bar Association conference, "Psychological Expertise and Criminal Justice" in the session entitled, "Psychology, Law and Eyewitness Identification." Information on the conference course books and audiotapes (single or entire set) is available at (800) 374-2721, x5991.

delicious

Friday, January 29, 2010

Supreme Court Case - 1st Amendment Campaign Law

CITIZENS UNITED v. FEDERAL ELECTION
COMMISSION

appeal from the united states district court for the district of columbia

No. 08-205. Argued March 24, 2009--Reargued September 9, 2009--Decided January 21, 2010

As amended by §203 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), federal law prohibits corporations and unions from using their general treasury funds to make independent expenditures for speech that is an "electioneering communication" or for speech that expressly advocates the election or defeat of a candidate. 2 U. S. C. §441b. An electioneering communication is "any broadcast, cable, or satellite communication" that "refers to a clearly identified candidate for Federal office" and is made within 30 days of a primary election, §434(f)(3)(A), and that is "publicly distributed," 11 CFR §100.29(a)(2), which in "the case of a candidate for nomination for President ... means" that the communication "[c]an be received by 50,000 or more persons in a State where a primary election ... is being held within 30 days," §100.29(b)(3)(ii). Corporations and unions may establish a political action committee (PAC) for express advocacy or electioneering communications purposes. 2 U. S. C. §441b(b)(2). In McConnell v. Federal Election Comm'n, 540 U. S. 93, 203-209, this Court upheld limits on electioneering communications in a facial challenge, relying on the holding in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U. S. 652, that political speech may be banned based on the speaker's corporate identity.

In January 2008, appellant Citizens United, a nonprofit corporation, released a documentary (hereinafter Hillary) critical of then-Senator Hillary Clinton, a candidate for her party's Presidential nomination. Anticipating that it would make Hillary available on cable television through video-on-demand within 30 days of primary elections, Citizens United produced television ads to run on broadcast and cable television. Concerned about possible civil and criminal penalties for violating §441b, it sought declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing that (1) §441b is unconstitutional as applied to Hillary; and (2) BCRA's disclaimer, disclosure, and reporting requirements, BCRA §§201 and 311, were unconstitutional as applied to Hillary and the ads. The District Court denied Citizens United a preliminary injunction and granted appellee Federal Election Commission (FEC) summary judgment.

Held:

1. Because the question whether §441b applies to Hillary cannot be resolved on other, narrower grounds without chilling political speech, this Court must consider the continuing effect of the speech suppression upheld in Austin. Pp. 5-20.

(a) Citizen United's narrower arguments--that Hillary is not an "electioneering communication" covered by §441b because it is not "publicly distributed" under 11 CFR §100.29(a)(2); that §441b may not be applied to Hillary under Federal Election Comm'n v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 551 U. S. 449 (WRTL), which found §441b unconstitutional as applied to speech that was not "express advocacy or its functional equivalent," id., at 481 (opinion of Roberts, C. J.), determining that a communication "is the functional equivalent of express advocacy only if [it] is susceptible of no reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for or against a specific candidate," id., at 469-470; that §441b should be invalidated as applied to movies shown through video-on-demand because this delivery system has a lower risk of distorting the political process than do television ads; and that there should be an exception to §441b's ban for nonprofit corporate political speech funded overwhelming by individuals--are not sustainable under a fair reading of the statute. Pp. 5-12.

(b) Thus, this case cannot be resolved on a narrower ground without chilling political speech, speech that is central to the First Amendment's meaning and purpose. Citizens United did not waive this challenge to Austin when it stipulated to dismissing the facial challenge below, since (1) even if such a challenge could be waived, this Court may reconsider Austin and §441b's facial validity here because the District Court "passed upon" the issue, Lebron v. National Railroad Passenger Corporation, 513 U. S. 374, 379; (2) throughout the litigation, Citizens United has asserted a claim that the FEC has violated its right to free speech; and (3) the parties cannot enter into a stipulation that prevents the Court from considering remedies necessary to resolve a claim that has been preserved. Because Citizen United's narrower arguments are not sustainable, this Court must, in an exercise of its judicial responsibility, consider §441b's facial validity. Any other course would prolong the substantial, nationwide chilling effect caused by §441b's corporate expenditure ban. This conclusion is further supported by the following: (1) the uncertainty caused by the Government's litigating position; (2) substantial time would be required to clarify §441b's application on the points raised by the Government's position in order to avoid any chilling effect caused by an improper interpretation; and (3) because speech itself is of primary importance to the integrity of the election process, any speech arguably within the reach of rules created for regulating political speech is chilled. The regulatory scheme at issue may not be a prior restraint in the strict sense. However, given its complexity and the deference courts show to administrative determinations, a speaker wishing to avoid criminal liability threats and the heavy costs of defending against FEC enforcement must ask a governmental agency for prior permission to speak. The restrictions thus function as the equivalent of a prior restraint, giving the FEC power analogous to the type of government practices that the First Amendment was drawn to prohibit. The ongoing chill on speech makes it necessary to invoke the earlier precedents that a statute that chills speech can and must be invalidated where its facial invalidity has been demonstrated. Pp. 12-20.

2. Austin is overruled, and thus provides no basis for allowing the Government to limit corporate independent expenditures. Hence, §441b's restrictions on such expenditures are invalid and cannot be applied to Hillary. Given this conclusion, the part of McConnell that upheld BCRA §203's extension of §441b's restrictions on independent corporate expenditures is also overruled. Pp. 20-51.

(a) Although the First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech," §441b's prohibition on corporate independent expenditures is an outright ban on speech, backed by criminal sanctions. It is a ban notwithstanding the fact that a PAC created by a corporation can still speak, for a PAC is a separate association from the corporation. Because speech is an essential mechanism of democracy--it is the means to hold officials accountable to the people--political speech must prevail against laws that would suppress it by design or inadvertence. Laws burdening such speech are subject to strict scrutiny, which requires the Government to prove that the restriction "furthers a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest." WRTL, 551 U. S., at 464. This language provides a sufficient framework for protecting the interests in this case. Premised on mistrust of governmental power, the First Amendment stands against attempts to disfavor certain subjects or viewpoints or to distinguish among different speakers, which may be a means to control content. The Government may also commit a constitutional wrong when by law it identifies certain preferred speakers. There is no basis for the proposition that, in the political speech context, the Government may impose restrictions on certain disfavored speakers. Both history and logic lead to this conclusion. Pp. 20-25.

(b) The Court has recognized that the First Amendment applies to corporations, e.g., First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U. S. 765, 778, n. 14, and extended this protection to the context of political speech, see, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415, 428-429. Addressing challenges to the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, the Buckley Court upheld limits on direct contributions to candidates, 18 U. S. C. §608(b), recognizing a governmental interest in preventing quid pro quo corruption. 424 U. S., at 25-26. However, the Court invalidated §608(e)'s expenditure ban, which applied to individuals, corporations, and unions, because it "fail[ed] to serve any substantial governmental interest in stemming the reality or appearance of corruption in the electoral process," id., at 47-48. While Buckley did not consider a separate ban on corporate and union independent expenditures found in §610, had that provision been challenged in Buckley's wake, it could not have been squared with the precedent's reasoning and analysis. The Buckley Court did not invoke the overbreadth doctrine to suggest that §608(e)'s expenditure ban would have been constitutional had it applied to corporations and unions but not individuals. Notwithstanding this precedent, Congress soon recodified §610's corporate and union expenditure ban at 2 U. S. C. §441b, the provision at issue. Less than two years after Buckley, Bellotti reaffirmed the First Amendment principle that the Government lacks the power to restrict political speech based on the speaker's corporate identity. 435 U.S., at 784-785. Thus the law stood until Austin upheld a corporate independent expenditure restriction, bypassing Buckley and Bellotti by recognizing a new governmental interest in preventing "the corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of [corporate] wealth ... that have little or no correlation to the public's support for the corporation's political ideas." 494 U. S., at 660. Pp. 25-32.

(c) This Court is confronted with conflicting lines of precedent: a pre-Austin line forbidding speech restrictions based on the speaker's corporate identity and a post-Austin line permitting them. Neither Austin's antidistortion rationale nor the Government's other justifications support §441b's restrictions. Pp. 32-47.

(1) The First Amendment prohibits Congress from fining or jailing citizens, or associations of citizens, for engaging in political speech, but Austin's antidistortion rationale would permit the Government to ban political speech because the speaker is an association with a corporate form. Political speech is "indispensable to decisionmaking in a democracy, and this is no less true because the speech comes from a corporation." Bellotti, supra, at 777 (footnote omitted). This protection is inconsistent with Austin's rationale, which is meant to prevent corporations from obtaining " 'an unfair advantage in the political marketplace' " by using " 'resources amassed in the economic marketplace.' " 494 U. S., at 659. First Amendment protections do not depend on the speaker's "financial ability to engage in public discussion." Buckley, supra, at 49. These conclusions were reaffirmed when the Court invalidated a BCRA provision that increased the cap on contributions to one candidate if the opponent made certain expenditures from personal funds. Davis v. Federal Election Comm'n, 554 U. S. ___, ___. Distinguishing wealthy individuals from corporations based on the latter's special advantages of, e.g., limited liability, does not suffice to allow laws prohibiting speech. It is irrelevant for First Amendment purposes that corporate funds may "have little or no correlation to the public's support for the corporation's political ideas." Austin, supra, at 660. All speakers, including individuals and the media, use money amassed from the economic marketplace to fund their speech, and the First Amendment protects the resulting speech. Under the antidistortion rationale, Congress could also ban political speech of media corporations. Although currently exempt from §441b, they accumulate wealth with the help of their corporate form, may have aggregations of wealth, and may express views "hav[ing] little or no correlation to the public's support" for those views. Differential treatment of media corporations and other corporations cannot be squared with the First Amendment, and there is no support for the view that the Amendment's original meaning would permit suppressing media corporations' political speech. Austin interferes with the "open marketplace" of ideas protected by the First Amendment. New York State Bd. of Elections v. Lopez Torres, 552 U. S. 196, 208. Its censorship is vast in its reach, suppressing the speech of both for-profit and nonprofit, both small and large, corporations. Pp. 32-40.

(2) This reasoning also shows the invalidity of the Government's other arguments. It reasons that corporate political speech can be banned to prevent corruption or its appearance. The Buckley Court found this rationale "sufficiently important" to allow contribution limits but refused to extend that reasoning to expenditure limits, 424 U.S., at 25, and the Court does not do so here. While a single Bellotti footnote purported to leave the question open, 435 U. S., at 788, n. 26, this Court now concludes that independent expenditures, including those made by corporations, do not give rise to corruption or the appearance of corruption. That speakers may have influence over or access to elected officials does not mean that those officials are corrupt. And the appearance of influence or access will not cause the electorate to lose faith in this democracy. Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U. S. ___, distinguished. Pp. 40-45.

(3) The Government's asserted interest in protecting shareholders from being compelled to fund corporate speech, like the antidistortion rationale, would allow the Government to ban political speech even of media corporations. The statute is underinclusive; it only protects a dissenting shareholder's interests in certain media for 30 or 60 days before an election when such interests would be implicated in any media at any time. It is also overinclusive because it covers all corporations, including those with one shareholder. P. 46.

(4) Because §441b is not limited to corporations or associations created in foreign countries or funded predominately by foreign shareholders, it would be overbroad even if the Court were to recognize a compelling governmental interest in limiting foreign influence over the Nation's political process. Pp. 46-47.

(d) The relevant factors in deciding whether to adhere to stare decisis, beyond workability--the precedent's antiquity, the reliance interests at stake, and whether the decision was well reasoned--counsel in favor of abandoning Austin, which itself contravened the precedents of Buckley and Bellotti. As already explained, Austin was not well reasoned. It is also undermined by experience since its announcement. Political speech is so ingrained in this country's culture that speakers find ways around campaign finance laws. Rapid changes in technology--and the creative dynamic inherent in the concept of free expression--counsel against upholding a law that restricts political speech in certain media or by certain speakers. In addition, no serious reliance issues are at stake. Thus, due consideration leads to the conclusion that Austin should be overruled. The Court returns to the principle established in Buckley and Bellotti that the Government may not suppress political speech based on the speaker's corporate identity. No sufficient governmental interest justifies limits on the political speech of nonprofit or for-profit corporations. Pp. 47-50.

3. BCRA §§201 and 311 are valid as applied to the ads for Hillary and to the movie itself. Pp. 50-57.

(a) Disclaimer and disclosure requirements may burden the ability to speak, but they "impose no ceiling on campaign-related activities," Buckley, 424 U. S., at 64, or " ' "prevent anyone from speaking," ' " McConnell, supra, at 201. The Buckley Court explained that disclosure can be justified by a governmental interest in providing "the electorate with information" about election-related spending sources. The McConnell Court applied this interest in rejecting facial challenges to §§201 and 311. 540 U. S., at 196. However, the Court acknowledged that as-applied challenges would be available if a group could show a " 'reasonable probability' " that disclosing its contributors' names would " 'subject them to threats, harassment, or reprisals from either Government officials or private parties.' " Id., at 198. Pp. 50-52.

(b) The disclaimer and disclosure requirements are valid as applied to Citizens United's ads. They fall within BCRA's "electioneering communication" definition: They referred to then-Senator Clinton by name shortly before a primary and contained pejorative references to her candidacy. Section 311 disclaimers provide information to the electorate, McConnell, supra, at 196, and "insure that the voters are fully informed" about who is speaking, Buckley, supra, at 76. At the very least, they avoid confusion by making clear that the ads are not funded by a candidate or political party. Citizens United's arguments that §311 is underinclusive because it requires disclaimers for broadcast advertisements but not for print or Internet advertising and that §311 decreases the quantity and effectiveness of the group's speech were rejected in McConnell. This Court also rejects their contention that §201's disclosure requirements must be confined to speech that is the functional equivalent of express advocacy under WRTL's test for restrictions on independent expenditures, 551 U. S., at 469-476 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.). Disclosure is the less-restrictive alternative to more comprehensive speech regulations. Such requirements have been upheld in Buckley and McConnell. Citizens United's argument that no informational interest justifies applying §201 to its ads is similar to the argument this Court rejected with regard to disclaimers. Citizens United finally claims that disclosure requirements can chill donations by exposing donors to retaliation, but offers no evidence that its members face the type of threats, harassment, or reprisals that might make §201 unconstitutional as applied. Pp. 52-55.

(c) For these same reasons, this Court affirms the application of the §§201 and 311 disclaimer and disclosure requirements to Hillary. Pp. 55-56.

Reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded.

Kennedy, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Scalia and Alito, JJ., joined, in which Thomas, J., joined as to all but Part IV, and in which Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor, JJ., joined as to Part IV. Roberts, C. J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Alito, J., joined. Scalia, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Alito, J., joined, and in which Thomas, J., joined in part. Stevens, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor, JJ., joined. Thomas, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.

Monday, January 25, 2010

How To Start Your Own RSS Page

Let's say that you're tired of checking a whole list of websites on a daily basis. The best solution to this problem would be to start your own RSS page. RSS files provide news updates from a website in a simple form for your computer. As a blogger from Kuwait, I have to say that it's time consuming to check all the Kuwaiti Blogs (there about about 50 popular ones). So instead of accessing them one at a time, The RSS page only gets me the topics and the first sentences of what has been posted from all 50 websites on one list. From there, I can choose what I want to read or not, sort of like an email inbox.

As you can see from this picture, on the left column, I got a list of the websites I am subscribed to. And by clicking on any of those sites, I will get the list of topics from that site specifically. The RSS page will help you by updating you instantly of any additions made to the professor's blog.

If you'd like to start your own RSS Page. Here are some good websites and applications I recommend:

For Mac: NewsGator
Web Based RSS page (Both Mac and PC): Bloglines

Sunday, January 24, 2010

Course Description - Business Law I - Spring 2010

University of San Diego
School of Business Administration

ETLW 311 – Business Law I
Spring 2010




Richard E. Custin email: rcustin@sandiego.edu
Olin Hall Office 205

Office Hours- MWF 7A.M. to 8 A.M & 10 A.M. to 11 A.M.
619 260-4854
Class Blog: http://custinusd.blogspot.com/

Course Description:


“Covers the fundamentals of United States law and legal system, relationship of law to ethics, torts, risk management, insurance, and hiring and managing an attorney. Special emphasis is given to preventing legal problems and resolving conflicts in business for business practitioners. Systems and methods of dispute resolution are considered including negotiation, mediation, arbitration, and the U.S. judicial system including small claims court.”

Course Objectives:

Students who complete this course will be able to:

A. To develop a plan for personal and business litigation avoidance
B. To understand the basic functions and jurisdictional requirements of state and federal courts
C. To understand various legal systems including common law and civil law
D. To distinguish between civil, criminal & statutory law, substantive and procedural law
E. To develop and refine critical thinking skills including legal reading, writing and application of law to fact
F. To understand and apply the law of torts, contracts, the Uniform Commercial Code, sales, agency, employment and business transactions
G. To develop strategies to effectively utilize alternative dispute resolution
H. To understand issues involving risk management and insurance
I. To develop effective negotiation strategies
J. To understand, appreciate and apply ethical principles as they relate to business and law





Key topics to be covered this semester are:

The Origin and Application of the Common Law

Criminal & Civil Law

Small Claims Procedure

Selecting an Attorney

Court Jurisdiction: Personal Jurisdiction, Subject Matter Jurisdiction & Venue

The Anatomy of a Civil Lawsuit

Torts: Intentional Torts, Negligence, Strict Liability & Business Torts

Contracts: The Uniform Commercial Code & the Common Law

Ethical Issues in Law

Risk Management & Insurance

Alternative Dispute Resolution: Mediation & Arbitration



Required Course Materials:
Dynamic Business Law, Kubasek, McGraw Hill, (2009)



Course Requirements and Student Evaluation:

Attendance:

We fully expect that students will attend all scheduled classes. All students will be provided two absences during the Spring Term. Your final cumulative point total may be reduced five points for each absence in excess of two days. Please do not enter the classroom late. Tardiness may count as a class absence. Please note: Students in prior semesters have occasionally ignored the attendance and tardiness rule and have earned poor grades. You may not attend another section of Business Law I absent extraordinary reasons and upon advance notice to the instructor.



Caveat:

Average work in this course will result in a “C’ grade. You must be prepared to discuss the material assigned and the cases contained within. In the event you are unprepared for any class question or case discussion your overall cumulative grade points may be reduced five points for each instance you are unprepared. We need your active participation! Please do not use phones, text or email during class. You may use your computer assuming this use is exclusively for taking class notes or using the electronic version of the text. You must have a text available in each class meeting.

Please provide me with a valid e-mail address. I may contact you via e-mail with information concerning class cancellations, assignments, due dates and supplemental reading. An e-mail message created and sent to you creates a presumption that the e-mail was received and read by you. Therefore, check your e-mail regularly! You may need access to the Internet to complete some assignments.

No make-up examinations will be given absent extraordinary reasons. (ie: major earthquakes-8.0+, tornados, floods- like the “Ark”, impending end of world, and disasters of monstrous proportion) No assignments will be accepted after the announced due date.

Grading:

Scale: A+ 100-97, A 96-92, A-91-90, B+89, B 88-82, B-80-81, C+ 79, C 78-72, C-71-70, D+ 69, D 68-62, D- 61-60, less than 60=F

3 tests = 40%
Multiple choice / Essay

Written Assignments / Case Briefs = 10%

In-Class and Blog Participation = 10%

Final Examination - Comprehensive = 40%



Statement on Academic Integrity:

“All members of the University community share the responsibility for maintaining an environment of academic integrity since academic dishonesty is a threat to the University. Acts of academic dishonesty include: a) unauthorized assistance on an examination; b) falsification or invention of data; c) unauthorized collaboration on an academic exercise; d) plagiarism; e) misappropriation of resource materials; f) any unauthorized access of an instructor's files or computer account; or g) any other serious violation of academic integrity as established by the instructor.”

School of Business Administration Mission Statement:

To develop socially responsible business leaders with a global outlook through academically rigorous, relevant, and values-based education and research.

Friday, January 22, 2010

Pray and get your flight grounded

Read below. This is a pretty upsetting article. Basically a Jewish boy doing his morning prayers while wearing teffilin which disturbed passengers. The flight was grounded.

http://jta.org/news/article/2010/01/22/1010277/after-teffilin-flight-flap-orthodox-group-calls-for-training

Thursday, January 21, 2010

Basketball Camp's Exclusion of HIV-Positive Boy Ruled Discrimination

New York Law Journal

January 22, 2010

An HIV-positive 10-year-old boy was discriminated against when he was denied admission to a Rockland County, N.Y. basketball camp, a federal judge has ruled.

Judge Donald C. Pogue granted a motion for declaratory relief on the boy's behalf against the Deer Mountain Day Camp, finding that the camp had violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).

"The court agrees that defendants were obligated to protect other campers from a very serious, life-threatening viral infection," Pogue said. "But this obligation does not excuse defendants' actions when based on unsubstantiated fears."

Pogue, a judge on the Court of International Trade who was sitting by designation in the Southern District of New York, made his ruling in Doe v. Deer Mountain Day Camp, 07 Civ. 5495.

Until Jane Doe applied for her son, Adam Doe, in 2004 to participate in the Deer Mountain Basketball Academy, the academy had never denied admission to a child because of a medical condition.

The camp had used, and trained staff in, what are called "universal precautions," safety measures for handling bodily fluids, such as the wearing of gloves, gowns, aprons, masks or protective eyewear to reduce exposure. The camp also keeps its swimming pool properly chlorinated.

Adam Doe, who contracted HIV at birth due to a perinatal infection, takes antiretroviral medications and, until the controversy over his admission to the camp, his condition had been kept confidential.

On Aug. 17 or 18, 2004, a doctor who is Adam's primary physician informed camp owners Roberta and Carol Katz that Adam was HIV-positive.

Roberta Katz later said in depositions that she felt suspicious because Jane Doe had not disclosed her son's illness and the camp was left with little time to research his medications and to learn about the possibility of side effects and/or gastrointestinal upsets, which according to the camp nurse, might make the virus transmittable in the camp swimming pool.

"They were concerned about their inability, as they saw it, to account for the risks associated with Adam's participation in the Deer Mountain Basketball Academy, such as providing him with a separate pool or toilet as allegedly recommended" by another physician, Judge Pogue said.

But the judge said neither the Katzes nor the camp nurse followed up by telephoning Jane Doe or Adam Doe's HIV specialist.

The next contact came, he said, when Roberta Katz called Jane Doe and said Adam could not attend the camp. In a deposition, Jane Doe said Ms. Katz had told her during the call that a doctor had advised the academy that Adam could potentially transmit HIV through blood in his urine or stool.

After ruling that Adam had a disability under the ADA, Judge Pogue found the Deer Mountain Day Camp and the Deer Mountain Basketball Academy were "public accommodations" within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§12101-213 and that "Adam's HIV-seropositivity played a motivating part" in the camp's decision to deny him admission.

The judge then turned to the "direct threat defense" under 12182(b)(3), under which a public accommodation is not required to allow someone to use its goods, services or facilities "where such individuals pose a direct threat to the health or safety of others."

But here, he said, the defendants provided the court with no "objective, medical evidence to support their threat determination."

The deposition of the camp nurse that HIV in a stool can survive in swimming pool water and that HIV can be transmitted by blood on a toilet seat did not match the "prevailing medical consensus," a departure from which can only be justified through "a credible scientific basis from the accepted norm," the judge said.

The case was handled for the Does by the Legal Action Center, Howard Sherwin of the Legal Aid Society of Rockland County and, on a pro bono basis, Lewis Liman of Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton.

Sally Friedman, legal director for the Legal Action Center, said there was a wave of cases involving HIV and children and schools during the height of the AIDS epidemic, but this is the first case she is aware of concerning a camp.

"This [decision] makes it crystal clear that if you run an extracurricular program for children you have to take universal precautions and you have to understand that HIV cannot be transmitted through casual contact or sports -- and people are charged with that knowledge," Friedman said. "Still, there is an enormous amount of ignorance about HIV transmission in this country and one of the reasons this is so significant is that the law does not sanction ignorance when it comes to people with disabilities."

Rodney Gould and Robert Mueller of Rubin, Hay & Gould in Framingham, Mass., represented the camp. Gould said the judge would now proceed to try the issue of damages and any appeal would come later.

"We're disappointed and we think he's wrong," Gould said.

 

legalize it?

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RDKarCeC_Ic
Contract Law for Dummies
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8r1CZTLk-Gk

It's relevant if you really try.

Legalizing Marijuana



News story on Fox News.
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,575114,00.html

Third Party Beneficiary

A third party beneficiary, in the law of contracts, is a person who may have the right to sue on a contract, despite not having originally been a party to the contract. This right arises where the third party is the intended beneficiary of the contract, as opposed to an incidental beneficiary. It vests when the third party relies on or assents to the relationship, and gives the third party the right to sue either the promisor or the promisee of the contract, depending on the circumstances under which the relationship was created.

In order for a third party beneficiary to have any rights under the contract, he must be an intended beneficiary, as opposed to an incidental beneficiary. The burden is on the third party to plead and prove that he was indeed an intended beneficiary.

Incidental beneficiary

An incidental beneficiary is a party who stands to benefit from the execution of the contract, although that was not the intent of either contracting party. For example, if party A, Andrew, hires party B, Bethany, to renovate his (Andrew's) house, and insists that Bethany use a particular house painter—party C, Charlie—because that house painter has an excellent reputation, then the house painter is an incidental beneficiary. Neither Andrew nor Bethany is entering into the contract with the particular intent to benefit Charlie. Andrew simply wants his house properly renovated; Bethany simply wants to be paid to do the renovation. If the contract is breached by either party in a way that results in Charlie never being hired for the job, Charlie nonetheless has no rights to recover anything under the contract.

Intended beneficiary

The distinction that creates an intended beneficiary is that one party - called the promisee - makes an agreement to provide some consideration to a second party - called the promisor - in exchange for the promisor's agreement to provide some product, service, or support to the third party beneficiary named in the contract. The promisee must have an intention to benefit the third party - but this requirement has an unusual meaning under the law. Although there is a presumption that the promisor intends to promote the interests of the third party in this way, if party A, Andrew, contracts with party B, Bethany, to have a thousand killer bees delivered to the home of Andrew's worst enemy, party C, Charlie, then Charlie is still considered to be the intended beneficiary of that contract.

There are two common situations in which the intended beneficiary relationship is created. One is the creditor beneficiary, which is created where Andrew owes some debt to Charlie, and Andrew agrees to provide some consideration to Bethany in exchange for Bethany's promise to pay Charlie some part of the amount owed.

The other is the donee beneficiary, which is created where Andrew wishes to make a gift to Charlie, and Andrew agrees to provide some consideration to Bethany in exchange for Bethany's promise to pay Charlie the amount of the gift. Under old common law principles, the donee beneficiary actually had a greater claim to the benefits this created; however, such distinctions have since been abolished.

Supreme Court supports first amendment rights.. kinda

Click for interesting article on the financial support of polititians
-Mike Renna

online poker

does anyone know why certain online poker websites are legal in the US and some arent?

Weight Watchers sues Jenny Craig

Check it out: http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/food/2010-01-19-weight-watchers-jenny-craig_N.htm

Weight Watchers is claiming JC's adds are misleading.

Wednesday, January 20, 2010

Here's the Definition of Statute of Frauds in CA

http://www.west.net/~smith/frauds.htm

Good Example of Unconscionability

hitler finds out scott brown won

this is just a funny video but somewhat relevant to our discussion in class

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E5VLeBhzE3Y&feature=related

Democrats reaction to losing Kennedy's seat http://www.1chan.net/rail/src/1261972811760.gif

Lisa McPherson and Scientology

Here is a story/case that I thought was very relevant to the class, especially the talk we had on how religion gets involved in the legal world. Just a warning, the whole case is somewhat disturbing.
Check it out

This is our problem with America today

I discovered the reason why Scott Brown won

Is Tylenol Negligent?

Tylenol has recalled tons of its products after they caused illness in its users.

I can see someone filing a lawsuit over this to try to make some cash. Will they sue for negligence? If so, does J&J have a duty?

I believe they have a duty produce drugs that will not make anyone sick, but their duty ends there.

http://abcnews.go.com/Health/WellnessNews/tylenol-problems-affected-extra-strength-rolaids/story?id=9561842

Pot Vote

http://www.nbcbayarea.com/news/politics/Pot-Legalization-Headed-for-2010-Ballot-7930497.html

Scott Brown's victory speech

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EKfT4Y9ZIuE

Attorney Generals threaten Lawsuit

According to the article below 1/3/2010, thirteen AGs from across the nation are threatening to file lawsuits if the Health Care bill is passed. The AGs claim the bill contains unconstitutional provisions that treat states unfairly among other things. Once we add on Florida's AG, who joined in the threat today (1/20/2010), there are now 14 AGs threatening lawsuit.

http://jkshaws.wordpress.com/2010/01/03/constitutionality-lawsuits-on-health-care-shakeup-dems/

Aftershock Rattles Nerves in Haitian Capital

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/21/world/americas/21haiti.html?ref=world


This is an article on the aftershock in Haiti.

Tuesday, January 19, 2010

an interesting clip from youtube showing haiti before and after the quake!
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0P92_hMC4Yw&feature=channel

found this on consideration....



Riveting stuff here...

AP predicts (R) Brown victor in MA senate race

http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/34923900/ns/politics-capitol_hill/?gt1=43001

Great news for the GOP and conservatives! Bad news for Obamunism's Healthcare Plan.

Royal Caribbean's decision to dock ships at Haitian resort creates controversy

http://news.yahoo.com/s/ynews/20100119/ts_ynews/ynews_ts1063
http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2010/01/19/new-mass-senator-sworn/

When should the new Mass. Senator be sworn in? How much do you wanna bet that it will depend on who wins?

Democrats "Nuclear Option"


Should Democrat Martha Coakley lose to Brown, the democrats have chosen to revise the healthcare bill inorder to only need majority to pass it.


-Mike Renna 

More info on considertion

this is a pretty helpful, big picture perspective of consideration

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Consideration

The Pact with the Devil-Pat Robertson

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/01/16/pat-robertson-haiti-quote_n_425841.html

Democrats May Seek to Push Health Bill Through House

Here is an interesting article on the Heath Care Bill, and how it relates to the election of Scott Brown.

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/19/health/policy/19health.html?ref=us

Get this in your contract

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704541004575011482898148788.html?mod=WSJ_hps_LEFTWhatsNews

Wow! Get paid $40 million to walk away from NBC. How does this ever make it in a contract?

Hamer v. Sidway decision

"The Court of Appeals reversed and directed that the judgment of the trial court be affirmed, with costs payable out of the estate.
Judge Parker, writing for a unanimous court, wrote that the forbearance of legal rights by Story II, namely consensual abstinence from 'drinking liquor, using tobacco, swearing, and playing cards or billiards for money until he turned 21 years of age' constituted consideration in exchange for the promise given by Story I. Because the forbearance was valid consideration by a party (Story II) in exchange for a promise to perform by another party (Story I), the promisee was contractually obligated to fulfill the promise.
Parker cited the Exchequer Chamber's 1875 definition of consideration: 'A valuable consideration in the sense of the law may consist either in some right, interest, profit or benefit accruing to the one party, or some forbearance, detriment, loss or responsibility given, suffered or undertaken by the other.'
The executor of Story I's estate, Sidway, was therefore legally bound to deliver the promised $5,000 to whoever currently held the interest in the sum, which by the time of the trial was Hamer."
found on wikipedia

Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission hears from bank CEOs

http://money.cnn.com/2010/01/13/news/economy/Bank_CEO/index.htm?cnn=yes

GOP Senator creates obstruction manual for health care

Corrupt much?

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/12/02/read-it-gop-senator-pens_n_377386.html

Sunday, January 17, 2010

Examples of negligence

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MnmolZGBWc8

Defamation

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cjyyxAU5lHU

Friday, January 15, 2010

Automobile Title Transfer

It seems that ownership is realeased as soon as the pinkslip is signed and dated. As far it goes with DMV that is up to the new owner but the seller is not responsible after he signs the car away.

Have the seller (and lienholder, if applicable) date and sign the Certificate of Title (pink slip) over to you in order to release ownership

Prosecutors Give Up

Prosecutors are giving up on trying John A. "Junior" Gotti of mob-related charges. Four trials in five years have ended up with hung juries (a jury that cannot agree upon a verdict after an extended period of deliberation and is unable to change its votes due to severe differences in opinion).

Here is the rest of the story.

http://www.cnn.com/2010/CRIME/01/13/new.york.feds.gotti/index.html

Crime does pay?

Crime Does Pay?


http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/01/13/after-4-trials-government-ends-its-case-against-gotti/

Thursday, January 14, 2010

Is it possible

Is it possible to have a non-verbal assault?  I have been trying to rationalize this because I can see it going either way.

contributory and comparative negligence

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Contributory_negligence

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comparative_negligence

Tuesday, January 12, 2010

Jarts

Just some interesting information on injuries and lawsuits against jarts!

http://www.texastriallawyer.com/lawn_darts/

AUTOMOBILE WORKERS v. JOHNSON CONTROLS, INC., 499 U.S. 187 (1991)


http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/cgi-bin/getcase.pl?court=us&vol=499&invol=187
McDonalds says their products are 100% fresh and natural. Is this misleading towards consumers to make the believe that McDonalds foods are healthy?


http://www.decisionquest.com/litigation_library.php?NewsID=180

Product Liability-Oxycontin

Who is liable for abuse of OxyContin when it is bought legally?

http://www.painandthelaw.org/mayday/noah_100101.php

Jarts for sale

http://www.lawndartparts.com/

There it is Professor Custin!

Jarts Video

Monday, January 11, 2010

Here is another article about the Jenny Jones that argues the side of the plantiff...The Jenny Jones Show had no forseeable risk of harm. Hope it's useful!

http://www.jewishworldreview.com/cols/elder051799.asp

Prop 8 Trial Starts!

Pretty prevalent stuff started off today. Here's a link outlining the events....

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/01/11/proposition-8-groundbreak_n_418475.html

women takes on IRS and wins

this is just an article off yahoo but pretty interesting

http://finance.yahoo.com/taxes/article/108550/nurse-outduels-irs-over-mba-tuition?mod=taxes-advice_strategy

Jenny Jones

Here is a little information on Scott Amerdure. He was the man murdered for revealing his attraction to Jonathan Schmitz on the Jenny Jones Show.

http://en.allexperts.com/e/s/sc/scott_amedure.htm

Jenny Jones Case

I found this article that gives some more details about the negligence case and the events that led up to it. Hope it's helpful.

http://www.cnn.com/SHOWBIZ/TV/9905/07/talk.show.slaying.03/

12-Year Old Bank Robber?

Two-female bank robbers in Ohio robbed a bank, one they believe to be 12-years old. They still can not find the two suspects.

http://ac360.blogs.cnn.com/2010/01/07/12-year-old-bank-robber/

The moral difficulties of being a good lawyer

http://standdown.typepad.com/weblog/2008/01/the-chicago-cas.html

Two Chicago public defenders knew of a man's innocence in a murder trial because their client (who was being charged in a separate case) admitted guilt but told the two men they couldn't reveal his secrete until after his death which they had to respect because of the attorney-client privilege. The very innocent Alton Logan served a 26 year sentence until he was cleared of all charges when the guilty man died and the public defenders came forward with the confession.

Friday, January 8, 2010

Plaintiff's Attorney in Case # 2 - Sexual Harassment

Three-year suspension recommended for high-profile San Francisco lawyer

In an unusually scathing opinion, a State Bar Court judge recommended that high profile San Francisco attorney Philip Kay be suspended for three years, citing his “rude and disrespectful conduct” during three trials as well as false accusations, frivolous motions and unrelenting bad behavior. The suspension will take effect if the Supreme Court signs off.

Kay, who is well-known for his successful sexual harassment lawsuits, including a 1994 case in which a legal secretary won a $6.9 million jury verdict against a Palo Alto attorney, was charged by the State Bar with 19 counts of misconduct.

Judge Lucy Armendariz found him guilty of 16 counts, including charges of misleading the court, improper contact with jurors, splitting fees with a non-lawyer and committing acts of moral turpitude. But she reserved her most caustic comments for what she called Kay’s “insolent behavior.”


Source: California Bar Journal, January 2010

Miami budget cuts

Just read this today, thought it was interesting considering our discussion concerning emergency room treatment yesterday.

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/08/health/policy/08dialysis.html?ref=us

Morality: From the Heavens or From Nature? A lecture by Dr. Andy Thompson

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jnXmDaI8IEo&feature=SeriesPlayList&p=D62809AD452EDB98

Qualified Immunity

If you decide to go to Coronado, CA and the police stops you for not wearing seat belt, please STAY IN THE CAR.

http://www.sdnn.com/sandiego/2009-12-29/local-county-news/courts/police-taser-zapper-not-qualified-for-immunity
we might not have to live in our parents basements after graduation after all

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/01/06/AR2010010603145.html?wprss=rss_business

Thursday, January 7, 2010

Advisory Opinions

Does anyone know about "how courts treat advisory opinions?"

Health Care Debate

Here's an interesting question to ponder.

Food has more to do with the immediate health of an individual than trips to the emergency room or doctor's office for non-life threatening injuries or illnesses. So why is it that you have to pay for your food before you can leave the store with it but you can get a service from a doctor and pay for it later or never pay for it at all? Why can you go to jail for stealing from a supermarket but not when you steal a doctor or hospital's time or money?

20/20 Special

20/20 Special on Healthcare

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gdx_2cuPgQQ&feature=related

Tabacco Marketing First Amendment

The following link will take you to an article that will look very similar to the Bad Frog v New York case we briefed last night.

http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/firstamendment/2010/01/challenge-to-new-federal-tobacco-marketing-restrictions-yields-mixed-result.html

Wednesday, January 6, 2010

healthcare article

Found this article and thought it presented the issue fairly well. Has a lot of input from numerous legal professors and professionals expressing diverse arguments from both sides.

http://www.cbsnews.com/blogs/2009/09/21/taking_liberties/entry5328314.shtml

Freedom of Speech no longer...

This lady is a little coooky but she does have a point.  I check out her facts and she is right on the money, so please pardon the Gone-in-60-seconds wannabe and checkout what she has to say.

Veggie Libel Laws

-Mike Renna

Paper

Hey guys! Here is a YouTube Video on whether Health Care is Constitutional.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nVy6JalOSAk

Tuesday, January 5, 2010

CASE ONE

Compensatory

Reconstructive Surgery - $25,000

Medical Costs - $200,000

Once a week, Total of one year Counseling. $25,000

Exemplary Punitive $0.00

TOTAL $250,000


CASE TWO

Compensatory

Therapy - $50,000

Pain and Suffering – $50,000

Exemplary Punitive $2.5 million

TOTAL $2.6 million


CASE THREE

Compensatory

Pain and Suffering – $2.0 million

Therapy - $100,000

Legal Fees for Children - $20,000

Exemplary Punitive $0.00

TOTAL $2.1 million

Our group came to a general agreement on each case.

Group 2

Case One
Compensatory- 5,000,000
Punitive- 0
Case Two
Compensatory- 150,000
Punitive- 3,000,000
Case Three
Compensatory- 4,000,000
Punitive- 0

Sunday, January 3, 2010

Business law I - Course Description- Intersession 2010

University of San Diego
School of Business Administration

ETLW 311 – Business Law I
Intersession 2010




Richard E. Custin email: rcustin@sandiego.edu
Olin Hall Office 205 Office Hours- by appointment
619 260-4854
Class Blog: http://custinusd.blogspot.com/

Course Description:


“Covers the fundamentals of United States law and legal system, relationship of law to ethics, torts, risk management, insurance, and hiring and managing an attorney. Special emphasis is given to preventing legal problems and resolving conflicts in business for business practitioners. Systems and methods of dispute resolution are considered including negotiation, mediation, arbitration, and the U.S. judicial system including small claims court.”

Course Objectives:

Students who complete this course will be able to:

A. To develop a plan for personal and business litigation avoidance
B. To understand the basic functions and jurisdictional requirements of state and federal courts
C. To understand various legal systems including common law and civil law
D. To distinguish between civil, criminal & statutory law, substantive and procedural law
E. To develop and refine critical thinking skills including legal reading, writing and application of law to fact
F. To understand and apply the law of torts, contracts, the Uniform Commercial Code, sales, agency, employment and business transactions
G. To develop strategies to effectively utilize alternative dispute resolution
H. To understand issues involving risk management and insurance
I. To develop effective negotiation strategies
J. To understand, appreciate and apply ethical principles as they relate to business and law





Key topics to be covered this semester are:

The Origin and Application of the Common Law

Criminal & Civil Law

Small Claims Procedure

Selecting an Attorney

Court Jurisdiction: Personal Jurisdiction, Subject Matter Jurisdiction & Venue

The Anatomy of a Civil Lawsuit

Torts: Intentional Torts, Negligence, Strict Liability & Business Torts

Contracts: The Uniform Commercial Code & the Common Law

Ethical Issues in Law

Risk Management & Insurance

Alternative Dispute Resolution: Mediation & Arbitration



Course Materials:
Dynamic Business Law, Kubasek, McGraw Hill, (2009)



Course Requirements and Student Evaluation:

Attendance:

We fully expect that students will attend all scheduled classes. All students will be provided one absence during the January Term. Your final cumulative point total may be reduced five points for each absence in excess of one day. Please do not enter the classroom late. Tardiness may count as a class absence. Please note: Students in prior semesters have occasionally ignored the attendance and tardiness rule and have earned poor grades.


Caveat:

Average work in this course will result in a “C’ grade. You must be prepared to discuss the material assigned and the cases contained within. In the event you are unprepared for any class question or case discussion your overall cumulative grade points may be reduced five points for each instance you are unprepared. We need your active participation!

Please provide me with a valid e-mail address. I may contact you via e-mail with information concerning class cancellations, assignments, due dates and supplemental reading. An e-mail message created and sent to you creates a presumption that the e-mail was received and read by you. Therefore, check your e-mail regularly! You may need access to the Internet to complete some assignments.

No make-up examinations will be given absent extraordinary reasons. (Ie: major earthquakes-8.0+, tornados, floods- like the “Ark”, impending end of world, and disasters of monstrous proportion) No assignments will be accepted after the announced due date.

Grading:

Scale: A+ 100-97, A 96-92, A-91-90, B+89, B 88-82, B-80-81, C+ 79, C 78-72, C-71-70, D+ 69, D 68-62, D- 61-60, less than 60=F

3 tests = 60%
Multiple choice / Essay

Written Assignments / Case Briefs= 20%

In-Class and Blog Participation= 20%



Statement on Academic Integrity:

“All members of the University community share the responsibility for maintaining an environment of academic integrity since academic dishonesty is a threat to the University. Acts of academic dishonesty include: a) unauthorized assistance on an examination; b) falsification or invention of data; c) unauthorized collaboration on an academic exercise; d) plagiarism; e) misappropriation of resource materials; f) any unauthorized access of an instructor's files or computer account; or g) any other serious violation of academic integrity as established by the instructor.”

School of Business Administration Mission Statement:

To develop socially responsible business leaders with a global outlook through academically rigorous, relevant, and values-based education and research.